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WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY POWER
IN THE WAKE OF THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY
JERRY CARANNANTE
"When a power is acknowledged to be necessary, it is a very dan-
gerous thing to prescribe limits to it, for men must have a greater
confidence in their own wisdom than I think any men are entitled
to, who imagine they can form such exact ideas of all possible
contingencies as to be sure that the restriction they propose will
not do more harm than good. "I
I. INTRODuc-ION
The United States Constitution grants the president "the
power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the
United States, except in cases of impeachment." 2 Due to the fact
that the clemency power authorizes the president to free and ab-
solve known and/or convicted criminals, the power has great po-
tential to stir controversy when exercised. In the wake of the
Clinton presidency, the existence and future of the clemency power
has never experienced more intense question and scrutiny. After
Clinton's pardon of fugitive financier Marc Rich, along with other
unpopular grants of clemency on the day he left office, many have
called for reforms of the sweeping clemency power retained by the
president. 3 Some of those proposed reforms are minor, calling for
statutory procedural requirements and/or increased public disclo-
sure, and others go as far as implementing a Constitutional amend-
ment requiring Senate approval of all clemency actions.
4
1. JAMES IREDELL, ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS (1787), REPRINTED IN PAM-
PHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 350, 351-52 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2000).
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
3. After an eight year Presidency already shrouded in controversy, the Clinton
pardons caused an uproar that prompted many outraged journalists, political commen-
tators, and legal and political scholars to call for reforms of the clemency power that are
too numerous to list here, but many of which will be explored throughout this Note.
4. See generally Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEx.
L. REv. 561 (2001).
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However, this Note opposes tampering with a system that has
worked as intended for as long as this government has existed. The
explicit intent of the Framers of the Constitution, a long line of
U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the separation of powers doctrine,
and the danger of doing greater damage to the public welfare by
reforming the clemency power all support this proposition. It
would be imprudent and unwise to ignore the strong precedent
mentioned briefly above in favor of a superficial reflex toward re-
form every time the media publicizes the one or two questionable
pardons among the literally thousands of deserving grants of clem-
ency that have been issued in the past.5
Section II of this Note defines clemency and illustrates its five
different forms. Section II also describes the origins of the clem-
ency power in Western civilization, how it developed in England
and in the United States, and how the power has been used and
interpreted throughout American history.
Section III then discusses the Clinton pardons that have inten-
sified the debate to such a high level as well as some noteworthy
reforms of the clemency power that have been proposed.
Section IV discusses this Note's argument that despite the great
unrest in the wake of the Clinton Presidency regarding the clem-
ency power, any action toward reform will likely be more harmful
than inaction. Therefore, the answer as to what should Constitu-
tionally be done in the wake of the Clinton Presidency is quite sim-
ple: absolutely nothing.
II. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CLEMENCY
Clemency Defined
This Note focuses on the federal executive clemency power
granted by the U.S. Constitution. 6 The executive clemency power
found in Article II, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution in all its forms is
commonly referred to as the pardon power. However, as demon-
strated below, pardoning is only one of the five forms of clemency.
5. In the twentieth century alone, there have been well over 20,000 grants of
federal executive clemency. See Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President As His
Own Judge and Jury: A Legal Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV.
197, 211 (1997).
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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Therefore, for purposes of uniformity and clarity, this Note will
hereinafter refer to any act of clemency, pursuant to the power
granted to the president in Article II, § 2, simply as "clemency" or
"the clemency power."
Clemency is an official act by the president 7 that removes all or
some of the consequences that result from a criminal conviction, or
may result in the future.8 The exercise of clemency can take a num-
ber of forms: pardons, amnesty, reprieves, commutations, and re-
mission of fines and forfeitures. Pardon is the broadest form of
clemency. A full pardon exempts the grantee from punishment
and removes any guilt, so that the offender becomes as innocent as
if the offense was never committed.9 A pardon can also be partial
where an offender is not completely released from all consequences
of the offense, but only those specified at the time the pardon is
granted. 10 It can be absolute or conditional, contingent on the fu-
ture acts or omissions of the offender stipulated by the president.1"
It can be granted following trial, conviction, sentencing, or before
charges or accusations are even made.12 Pardons are often granted
to restore the reputation and civil rights of offenders who have
served their sentences and/or have lived admirable lives after com-
mitting the crimes. 1
3
Amnesties can be distinguished from pardons because they are
usually granted to groups or classes of people, and usually before
conviction.1 4 Amnesty, unlike a pardon, does not restore the of-
7. Although clemency is usually granted by a government's chief executive, and
for the purpose of this Note, the President of the United States, it can also be granted
by state legislatures and by the United States Congress. See 59 AM. JUR. 2r) Pardon and
Parole § 10 (2001).
8. See id.
9. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866).
10. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTER-
EST 5 (1989).
11. Id.
12. Id. For example, President Ford granted a pardon to former President Nixon
before Nixon was charged with any crimes as a civilian. See id.
13. Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power From
the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 576 (1991).
14. See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 95 (1915). See also MOORE, supra
note 10, at 5. For example, President Carter's grant of amnesty to Vietnam War draft
evaders. See id. at 81-82.
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fender's reputation or civil rights.1 5 Amnesty forgets but does not
forgive crimes.1 6 However, the distinction between amnesty and
pardon is far more academic than practical. 17 The effects of the
two are in practical terms identical, and the Supreme Court recog-
nizes little distinction between them.1 8
A third form of clemency is the reprieve. Reprieves are the
most limited form of clemency because they do not remove guilt or
sentences but only temporarily postpone punishment.1 9 Reprieves
typically postpone executions until death-row inmates can give
birth, recover from illness, or be heard on a final appeal.
2 0
A commutation is a form of clemency where a lesser punish-
ment is substituted for the sentence imposed by a court.21 Commu-
tations are distinguished from pardons in that they do not release
the offender from the consequences or guilt of an offense; they
simply reduce punishment. 22 Commutations are commonly used to
reduce sentences to time already served or to reduce death
sentences to life sentences.
23
Finally, the clemency power has been held to extend to include
the ability of the president to release offenders from fines and for-
feitures levied by the United States.24
The Origins of Clemency
The earliest traces of clemency can be found in the Code of
Hammurabi from the eighteenth century B.C., even though the
Code is famous for its harshness. 25 The Old Testament, while also
portraying harsh punishments and a vengeful God, is full of stories
of mercy and reduced punishments. 26 In the governments of an-
15. Kobil, supra note 13, at 577.
16. See MOORE, supra note 10, at 81-82.
17. See Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1877).
18. See id.
19. See Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 43-44 (1916).
20. See MOORE, supra note 10, at 5.
21. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 273 n.8 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22. See id.
23. MOORE, supra note 10, at 5.
24. See Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474, 479 (1875).
25. See MOORE, supra note 10, at 15.
26. For an example, see id. at 16 where Moore gives the example of God commut-
ing the sentence of Cain by allowing him to live in the land of Nod after he committed
the oldest crime in history, the murder of his brother. See Genesis 4:12, 16.
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cient Greece and Rome, clemency was often granted for non-judi-
cial reasons, as these societies saw the law as originating from
infallible gods. 27 As evidenced by the clemency power exercised
when Pontius Pilate exonerated Barrabus during the crucifixions of
he and Jesus Christ, the Jews and the Romans had customs of par-
doning criminals, especially on holidays.28 In fact, the Romans
often used clemency as a political tool to quiet discontent through-
out the vast Roman Empire, thereby reinforcing its power.29
The Development of Clemency in England
Originally, many of those who held power in England - the
king, clergy, and courts - fought for the right to punish and to par-
don.3o In 1535, the clemency power was formally granted to the
king under Henry VIII by an act of Parliament: "no other person
has the power to pardon or remit any treason or felonies whatso-
ever; but that the king has the whole and sole power thereof, united
and knit to the imperial crown of his realm."31 Clemency was also
used as a political tool in England, not unlike its use in the Roman
Empire. 32 Blackstone stated that the king's acts of clemency en-
deared him to his subjects and strengthened their loyalty to him.33
Although the clemency power in England was often successful
in protecting against a harsh and rigid judicial system, abuses of the
royal clemency power did exist, and later advocates of a clemency
power in America were well aware of this.34 For example, the open
and notorious sale of clemency was commonplace, prompting wide-
spread criticism. 35 The clemency power was not only used to fur-
ther the interests of the king, but of the state as well. Criminals
27. See Kobil, supra note 13, at 583-86.
28. See MOORE, supra note 10, at 16-17.
29. See id.
30. See Stanley Grupp, Some Historical Aspects of the Pardon in England, 7 Am. J. LEGAL
HIsT. 51, 55 (1963).
31. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 315 (Wayne Morrison ed., 2001).
32. See id. at 316. See also, EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 233 (4th ed. 1669).
33. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at 316.
34. See Kobil, supra note 13, at 588-89.
35. See id. at 589; see Grupp, supra note 30, at 59 ("the purchase of a pardon was
once a common practice and seems to have been generally associated with the procure-
ment of a pardon in early times").
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were granted clemency on the condition that they travel to the colo-
nies in America and work on the plantations.3 6 Clemency was also
granted on the condition that the criminals join the Royal Navy, or
even to secure testimony by the criminals that would incriminate
their accomplices.
37
Clemency in the British Colonies in America
The British clemency power followed the colonists to
America.38 The power was delegated by the king to executive au-
thorities of each colony, usually the royal governor. 39 The colonial
charters of Virginia, Massachusetts Bay, Maryland, Maine, the Caro-
linas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Georgia explicitly granted the
clemency power to the respective governors.40 However, after the
Revolution and before the Constitution, the common fear of a
strong central government caused a sharp decline in the general
power of executives and the clemency power was no exception.
4 1
By 1787, most states had granted the clemency power to their gover-
nors and legislative councils jointly or to the legislature alone, 42
and there was no national clemency power under the Articles of
Confederation. 43 However, with the increasing calls for a stronger
central government and a stronger chief executive after the failure
of the Articles, support mounted for a strong federal clemency
power much like that of England.44 This was evidenced by the fact
that the governors of New York, Delaware, Maryland, North Caro-
lina, and South Carolina possessed unilateral clemency powers at
this point.
45
36. Kobil, supra note 13, at 589.
37. Id.
38. For a more detailed discussion of the clemency power in the colonies, see Wil-
liam F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 475, 497-501 (1977).
39. Id.
40. See id. at 497. For example, the Virginia charter of 1609 granted the governor
"full and absolute Power and Authority to correct, punish, pardon, govern, and rule all
such Subjects of Us, our Heires, and Successors as shall from Time to Time adventure
themselves." See id. The other colonies used similar language. See id.
41. See Kobil, supra note 13, at 590.
42. Id.
43. Duker, supra note 38, at 500.
44. See generally id.
45. See Kobil, supra note 13, at 590.
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Presidential Uses of the Clemency Power
Among the first exercises of the clemency power granted
under Article II of the Constitution was President George Washing-
ton's pardons of the leaders of the Whiskey Rebellion in 1795 after
their attempt to prevent collection of a federal tax on whiskey.
46
Similarly, PresidentJohn Adams pardoned members of an insurrec-
tion in Pennsylvania. 47 President Thomas Jefferson granted clem-
ency to his political allies after they were convicted under the
Sedition Act of publishing Anti-Federalist material.
48
This use of the clemency power, not just in instances deserving
of mercy, but also for the purpose of promoting unity and tranquil-
ity, gained much significance in the years preceding, during, and
after the Civil War. 49 For the first time, large numbers of Ameri-
cans were being conscripted.50 This, coupled with the nature of the
War, which pitted Americans against each other, led to a great deal
of desertion and draft evasion. 5 1 President Abraham Lincoln
granted clemency to these deserters and evaders on the condition
that they return and fight, and many did.52 After the Civil War,
Presidents Lincoln, Andrew Johnson, and Ulysses S. Grant all
granted clemency to leaders and supporters of the Confederacy.
53
Controversy over the clemency power was relatively quiet again
until the later part of the twentieth century. In perhaps the most
famous pardon in American history, President Gerald Ford granted
a pardon to former President Richard Nixon after Nixon resigned
the Presidency during the Watergate scandal. 54 Ford granted the
pardon "for all offenses against the United States" for the purposes
of restoring tranquility and giving closure after a tumultuous and
disgraceful period in American politics. 55 This pardon greatly con-
tributed to Ford's loss of the next presidential election.
56
46. See Nida & Spiro, supra note 5, at 211.
47. Id.
48. Id.





54. See MOORE, supra note 10, at 80.
55. Id. at 81.
56. See id.
20031
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More controversy came in 1977 when President Jimmy Carter
granted amnesty to all Vietnam draft evaders.57 This grant of clem-
ency has taken place after every major American war but emotions
ran especially high during and after Vietnam. Therefore, Carter's
grant of amnesty to this entire class of people created much tumult,
regardless of its historical support.58
As the clemency power has become more visible in the press
and widely known and discussed, the number of acts of clemency
granted have consistently declined in the last half of the twentieth
century.59 Federal Regulations advise that the clemency application
process go through the Office of the Pardon Attorney and only be
accepted after a five year waiting period commencing with release
from confinement or conviction. 60 However, these regulations are
only advisory. 61 The president retains the authority to consider ap-
plications from individuals who are ineligible, and to grant clem-
ency sua sponte without receiving an application. 62
President Ronald Reagan granted only nine percent of clem-
ency applications, the lowest rate in history.63 The most controver-
sial of these was to New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner
for illegal campaign contributions during the 1970s.64 In the last
days of his Presidency, George H.W. Bush granted pardons to six
alleged players in the Iran-Contra scandal in which Bush himself
had been implicated. 65 It has been argued that the pardons were
used as a tool to prevent Bush and the other members of the scan-
dal from testifying against one another. 66 After Bush had granted
clemency in only 74 cases over four years, Clinton also granted rel-
57. See MooRE, supra note 10, at 80.
58. See id.
59. See Kurt Eichenwald & Michael Moss, Rising Numbers Sought Pardons In Last 2
Years, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, at Al. President Truman granted 1,913, Eisenhower
1,110, Kennedy 472, Johnson 960, Nixon 863, Ford 382, Carter 534, Reagan 393, Bush
74, and Clinton 395. Id.
60. See 28 C.F.R.§§ 1.1-1.2, 1.6 (2001).
61. See id. at § 1.11.
62. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Testimony of Pardon Attorney Roger C. Adams Before the
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, February 14, 2001 available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/pardon/testimony/adamsl .html.
63. See MooRE, supra note 10, at 82.





atively few pardons until the last moments of his eight year
Presidency.
67
Clemency and the U.S. Supreme Court
In Marbury v. Madison,68 Chief Justice John Marshall wrote for
the majority:
By the Constitution of the United States, the president is
invested with certain important political powers, in the
exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is
accountable only to his country in his political character,
and to his own conscience .... whatever opinion may be
entertained of the manner in which executive discretion
may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to
control that discretion... the decision of the executive is
conclusive.
6 9
The Supreme Court has clearly and consistently defended uni-
lateral and unqualified executive clemency. The first case to in-
volve the executive clemency power was United States v. Wilson in
1833.70 In Wilson, Chief Justice John Marshall recognized English
common law as the source of the American clemency power and
how it should operate in America. 7 1 Marshall described the Ameri-
can clemency power as an act that need not be justified to the judi-
ciary.7 2 Consequently, Marshall warned of the dangers of viewing
pardons from non-judicial, political eyes and overturning "those
rules which have been settled by the wisdom of ages."73 Implicit in
Marshall's definition of American clemency is the concept that the
president can exercise the power in any form, at any time, and for
any reason, except in cases of impeachment.
7 4
67. In Clinton's first seven years as President, he granted clemency only 219 times,
but in his final year, he granted 176. See Eichenwald & Moss, supra note 59.
68. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
69. Id. at 165-66
70. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150 (1833).
71. Wilson, 32 U.S. at 160.
72. Id. at 160-61.
73. See id. at 161.
74. See Kobil, supra note 13, at 593.
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In Ex parte Wells, 7 5 the Court interpreted the clemency power
very broadly, holding that the Constitution gives the president the
power to grant clemency in any form known in the law, and may
also condition the clemency on virtually any terms.
76
After a ruling that an act of clemency could be refused by the
grantee,77 the Court further expanded the clemency power in Bid-
dle v. Perovich,78 recognizing the clemency power as an essential part
of our Constitutional system in promoting the public welfare.
79 Jus-
tice Holmes stated that an act of clemency, "when granted... is the
determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will
be better served. .. 80
In Ex parte Grossman,81 the Court interpreted the clemency
power broadly at the expense of the judiciary. The Court held that
the president must have full discretion in exercising the clemency
power and that it extends to criminal contempt of court.
8 2
In Ex parte Garland,83 the Court gave its most expansive inter-
pretation of the executive clemency power:
The [clemency] power thus conferred is unlimited, [ex-
cept in cases of impeachment]. It extends to every of-
fense known to the law, and may be exercised at any
time.. .This power of the president is not subject to legis-
lative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his
pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offend-
ers. [The power] cannot be fettered by any legislative
restrictions.
8 4
75. Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307 (1855).
76. See id. at 310-15; See also Kobil, supra note 13, at 595-96; Armstrong v. United
States, 80 U.S. 154 (1872) (upholding President Johnson's grant of amnesty); Osborn v.
United States, 91 U.S. 474 (1875) (upholding the President's power to use clemency in
remitting fines and forfeitures); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871) (upholding
the power of the President to attach to a grant of clemency any conditions or qualifica-
tions he should see fit).
77. SeeBurdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915); See also Kobil, supra note 13, at
595.
78. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
79. Id. at 486.
80. Id.
81. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
82. See id. at 121-22.
83. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866).
84. Id. at 370-71.
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In a more recent case, Schick v. Reed,85 the Court reaffirmed the
view of Grossman. In the majority decision, Chief Justice Burger
spoke of the draftsmen of Article II of the Constitution who secured
the prerogative of the president to grant clemency without being
"fettered or embarrassed." 86 Chief Justice Burger added that the
clemency power "flows from the Constitution alone, not from any
legislative enactments, and that it cannot be modified, abridged, or
diminished by the Congress."
87
This support for a unilateral and unqualified clemency power
comes without any pertinent dissents.88 Any limitations that would
be imposed on the clemency power would have to be found in the
Constitution itself.89 The Supreme Court has made it invariably
clear that the clemency power was vested in the president alone for
good reason and that any changes or limitations whatsoever would
have to come in the form of a Constitutional amendment.
III. THE CLINTON PARDONS AND CALLS FOR REFORM OF THE
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY POWER
The Clinton Pardons
On January 20, 2001, the Clinton administration left power
and gave way to the administration of President George W. Bush.
The inauguration, however, was not the only big news to come out
of Washington that day. In the last hours of his Presidency, Clinton
exercised the executive clemency power for 176 individuals; a sharp
increase in the number of pardons granted both in the modern
trend as well as within the Clinton Presidency.9" A few of these par-
dons gave rise to the outrage and debate regarding the executive
clemency power and its potential for abuse. Normally, this com-
85. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
86. Id. at 384 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 447-49 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
87. Schick, 419 U.S. at 385.
88. Wilson, Grossman, and Biddle are unanimous opinions. The dissenting opin-
ions in Wells, Garland, Klein, and Schick do not challenge any language in the majority
opinions regarding the unilateral and unqualified nature of the clemency power.
89. See id.
90. See Marc Lacey, The Inauguration: The Presidential Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2001, at Al. Of these, 140 were classified as pardons and 36 as commutations of sen-
tence. Id.
2003]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
mon exercise of presidential clemency at the end of a term would
not have been so vigorously debated for so long. However, Clinton
had already made the headlines with his grant of clemency to 16
Puerto Rican terrorists in August 1999, which was seen by many as
serving the purpose of aiding the image of Hillary Clinton in her
U.S. Senate campaign.9' To make matters worse, Clinton's last min-
ute grants of clemency were surrounded by the controversies of one
pardon being granted to the President's half brother who served
time for dealing drugs, of Hillary Clinton's brother receiving
$400,000 in return for pardons, 92 and most of all, of the pardons of
Marc Rich and Pincus Green.
Rich and Green were indicted in the largest tax evasion case in
U.S. history.93 Once among the world's leading commodity traders,
the companies owned by Rich and Green pleaded guilty in 1984 to
tax evasion for hiding millions of dollars of profits made on crude
oil trading.94 The pair often refused to cooperate with prosecutors'
requests to produce documents. 95 They fled to Switzerland, which
refused to extradite them, to escape prosecution for the tax eva-
sion, racketeering, and mail and wire fraud.96 They never appeared
in any U.S. court and they have renounced their U.S. citizenship. 97
At the time of the pardon, it surfaced that Rich's ex-wife, De-
nise Rich, pledged $450,000 to the Clinton presidential library
before the pardons were issued. 98 This was later confirmed by one
of her lawyers during the Congressional hearings on the matter.99
An anonymous Democratic fundraiser also claimed that Ms. Rich
had pledged nearly $1 million in four installments over two
years. 100
91. See generally Eichenwald & Moss, supra note 59.
92. See David Johnston & Don Van Natta, Jr., The Clinton Pardons: The Lobbying,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2001, at Al.
93. Lacey, supra note 90.
94. Id.
95. See id.




100. Alison Leigh Cowan, Ex-Wife of Pardoned Financier Pledged Money to Clinton Li-
brary, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at Al.
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In addition, questions were raised as to whether Eric Holder,
Jr., a Clinton deputy attorney general, had attempted to engage in
any quid pro quo with Jack Quinn, Marc Rich's lawyer and a close
adviser to former Vice President Al Gore.10' Holder was believed to
have offered his assistance in securing the pardons in exchange for
Quinn's help in getting Holder appointed attorney general in a
possible Gore administration. 10 2 All sides denied any wrongdoing,
and Denise Rich never testified at any hearing, invoking her Consti-
tutional right against self-incrimination.
10 3
In an unusual action, former President Clinton defended his
acts of clemency, especially those granted to Rich and Green, in an
Op-Ed piece in the New York Times. 10 4 Clinton gave a number of
justifications for the pardons that he believed made Rich and
Green worthy of clemency.105 These justifications include, but are
not limited to, unfair prosecution against Rich and Green, evidence
that there was technically no wrongdoing, their past payment of
$200 million in fines and taxes, and the urging by Jewish leaders to
pardon Rich for his great services to Israeli charities.10 6 Clinton
also explained that, as a condition to the pardons, he required Rich
and Green to waive all defenses, including any statutes of limitation,
thus allowing the government to pursue any Energy Department,
civil tax, or other charge that might be warranted in the future.
10 7
Calls For Reform
Many citizens and politicians were enraged over this seemingly
blatant and defiant controversy at the end of a second term already
surrounded by scandal. So much so, that many journalists, citizens,
and even members of Congress were calling for a reform of the
101. Alison Leigh Cowan, Ex-Wife of Pardoned Financier Pledged Money to Clinton Li-
brary, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at Al.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001,
§ 4 at Page 13.
105. See id. These reasons are discussed a bit more in depth by the former Presi-
dent in the article.
106. See id.
107. See Clinton, supra note 104.
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executive clemency power that would prevent such an inappropri-
ate exercise in the future.108
It seems as though after the highly publicized and controver-
sial pardons granted by Ford, Carter, and Bush, coupled with the
already strong disapproval of the Clinton scandals, the American
body politic had had enough. Add the common perception that
Clinton granted the pardons in defiance of a public that chastised
him for his scandals and of the Congress which had recently im-
peached him, and the result is the most intense rhetoric and possi-
ble imminent reform of the executive clemency power since the
debates at the Constitutional Convention. This warrants a look at
some of the more noteworthy reforms that have been proposed
before the Clinton scandal which are gaining momentum in its
wake.
One such proposed reform is that a post conviction limitation
be imposed on the executive clemency power. 109 Under this propo-
sal, the president would be unable to exercise the clemency power
until the grantee has been formally convicted."i 0 The reasoning
behind the post conviction limitation centers around the contro-
versy of the Bush pardons of the Iran-Contra defendants.111 As
mentioned previously, many felt that the motivation for the par-
dons was to prevent misconduct from surfacing in further investiga-
tions or trials. 112
108. Countless articles appeared in major newspapers chastising Clinton for the
acts of clemency in the two months followingJan. 20, 2001, some even proposing actual
reforms. Also, there were a number of Congressional hearings that took place in Febru-
ary and March 2001 regarding the clemency process, the Clinton pardon of Marc Rich
in particular, and most importantly, the prospects of reforming the clemency power
with or without a Constitutional amendment. See, e.g., Hearing On President Clinton's
Pardons Before the House Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong. (2001); Hearing on Marc Rich
Pardon Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2001); Hearing on Pardons Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) ("Many here in Congress and across
the country have suggested constitutional or legislative changes that would restrict the
president's ability to issue pardons"); Id.
109. SeeJames N. Jorgensen, Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President's Preroga-
tive To Escape Accountability, 27 U. RiCH. L. REv. 345 (1993); See Scott P. Johnson &
Christopher E. Smith, White House Scandals and the Presidential Pardon Power: Persistent
Risks and Prospects For Reform, 33 NEw ENG. L. Riv. 907 (1999). Both articles offer a
proposal of a post conviction limitation.
110. See id.
111. SeeJorgensen, supra note 109, at 369.
112. See supra note 108.
[Vol. 47
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY POWER
Proponents of this limitation argue that it would prevent a
president from concealing misconduct as the prosecution and de-
fense of the trial could investigate and publicize relevant informa-
tion, thus increasing the accountability of all parties involved in the
wrongdoing. 113 The post conviction proponents recognize the pos-
sibility that defendants could simply enter a guilty plea to satisfy the
conviction requirement in expectation of a pardon.1 1 4 However,
their answer is if there are doubts about a defendant's sincerity in
these situations, the trial judge can simply reject the plea, thereby
forcing trial or more forthcoming answers from the defendant.115
Another noteworthy reform proposal is a requirement that
clemency only be granted for specific charges. 116 The specification-
of-charges-proponents argue that because a grant of clemency pre-
vents pursuit or investigation through the criminal justice system,
the requirement would enable the investigations of the news media
and Congress on the specific misdeeds involved.' 17 Additionally,
proponents point out that prosecutors would be free to pursue all
other charges not specified in the grant of clemency."1 " This pro-
posal would serve the purpose of preventing presidents from hiding
crimes and misdeeds committed by themselves and others because
they would not be able to issue sweeping grants of clemency. 1 9
A third proposal incorporates a set of proposals all in favor of
passing a Constitutional amendment restricting how and when a
president may exercise the clemency power. One such proposal is
the same made at the Constitutional Convention, that all acts of
clemency be subject to the consent of the Senate, much like many
other executive actions.120 A twist on this proposal is an amend-
ment subjecting all grants of clemency to an override by a two-
thirds vote of both Houses of Congress. 12 1 Another of these pro-
113. SeeJohnson & Smith, supra note 109, at 923-4.
114. See id; See alsoJorgensen, supra note 109, at 369.
115. SeeJohnson & Smith, supra note 109, at 923-4; See alsoJorgensen, supra note
109, at 369.
116. SeeJohnson and Smith, supra note 109, at 925.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. SeeJorgensen, supra note 109, at 370.
120. See 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
121. See Hearing on Pardons, supra note 108, at 6. This proposal was suggested by
U.S. Senator Arlen Specter.
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posals is an amendment that no grants of clemency may be issued
between October 1 of a presidential election year andJanuary 21 of
the following year. 122 Clearly, this amendment would prevent lame
duck presidents from issuing clemency before they leave office, but
essentially after they can be held responsible for unpopular grants.
A final and quite innovative proposal for reform is a bifurca-
tion of the clemency power. 123 This proposal entails the appoint-
ment of a politically independent clemency commission comprised
of "professional men."124 The commission would be appointed in a
manner similar to that of the federal judiciary: by the president and
for life during good behavior.125 This proposal would allow the
president to continue granting clemency in those cases which are
deemed by the commission to be unrelated to principles of justice
and to leave those decisions which would presumably enhance jus-
tice to the commission.' 26 Whichever body makes the decision, the
proposal calls for the president to report all acts of clemency to the
Congress immediately, which would be permitted to override the
act of clemency by a super-majority vote. 127 Because of the broad
and unilateral nature of the clemency power that has been granted
by the Constitution to the president alone, the proposal concedes
that the most logical choice to institute this reform is by executive
order.1
28
122. See id. at 7. This amendment was proposed by U.S. Representative Barney
Frank.
123. See generally Kobil, supra note 13. Professor Kobil spends the majority of his
article describing his proposal for bifurcation.
124. See id. at 622-23. Professor Kobil suggests a commission "composed entirely of
men: a psychiatrist, a jurist, a physician, a sociologist, an educator, perhaps a barrister,
and a criminologist." Id. at 623.
125. Id. There is no mention as to whether the appointments would require Senate
confirmation.
126. See id. Professor Kobil distinguishes clemency decisions that are 'justice-en-
hancing" such as those acts that would commute a blatantly discriminatory sentence,
and 'Justice-neutral" such as those that might restore order or unity. See id.
127. Kobil, supra note 13, at 638.
128. Id. at 622.
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IV. WHAT To Do ABOUT THE EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY POWER IN
THE WAKE OF THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY:
ABSOLUTELY NOTHING.
Appropriate and Inappropriate Uses of Clemency
The unilateral and discretionary nature of the clemency
power, coupled with the fact that the power was designed to protect
the president from passionate judgments from the public, Con-
gress, and the judiciary, make it very unclear what constitutes ap-
propriate and inappropriate uses of the power. U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes gave some guidance in Biddle
v. Perovich.129 Holmes recognized the unilateral and unqualified
nature of the clemency power but at the same time distinguished it
from a divine prerogative: "[Clemency] is not a private act of grace
from an individual happening to possess power. It is part of the
Constitutional scheme.. .it is the determination of the ultimate au-
thority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less
than what the judgment fixed."'130 An appropriate use of the clem-
ency power is simply one where the president uses it to prevent or
correct an injustice.' 31 Considering the fact that presidents need
notjustify their pardons, this broad and deferential standard almost
creates a presumption that a grant of clemency is appropriate un-
less shown otherwise. Therefore, it is much clearer to analyze what
would constitute an inappropriate use of clemency.
According to the standard in Biddle, an inappropriate grant of
clemency is one that solely advances the interests of the president,
his family, friends, or party.13 2 Consequently, when a president ref-
uses a grant of clemency due to the expectation of negative political
implications, this is also inappropriate.1
33
Any evidence of quid pro quo might not be enough to constitute
an inappropriate use on its own. For example, Clinton's pardon of
his brother was inappropriate because the only reason Roger Clin-
ton received it was because his brother was the president. There is
129. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
130. See id. at 486.
131. See Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon For Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RiCH. L.
Rav. 281, 285 (1993).
132. See Moore, supra note 131, for further discussion of this assertion.
133. See id.
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no justice or public interest that is served. On the other hand, a
very strong argument could be made that Ford's pardon of Nixon
was appropriate because while Ford was making the grant to a polit-
ical ally and Nixon was receiving special treatment as a former pres-
ident, Ford successfully spared the nation of putting a former
president on trial and keeping the saga going. So Ford furthered
the public welfare, and if anything, the pardon was actually detri-
mental to his own interests.1
3 4
In sum, perhaps the best way to describe an inappropriate
grant of clemency is one in which the personal interests of the pres-
ident are served in a greater proportion to the interests of justice
and of the public welfare.
Constitutionally Amending the Clemency Power
It is widely agreed that any meaningful change in the executive
clemency power would have to come in the form of a Constitutional
amendment. 135 The Code of Federal Regulations 1 36 provides clem-
ency guidelines, but they are only advisory in nature and need not
be followed. 137 The changes called for in the bifurcation proposal
would have to be adopted by an executive order by one president
and followed without being modified or abrogated by the executive
order of future presidents. In short, this proposal amounts to
merely requesting that presidents act properly in the dispatch of
the clemency power, as there is no way to enforce the proposal.
Because amending the Constitution is required to enforce any sig-
nificant reform, the question shifts to the need for and viability of
an amendment.
The Intent of the Framers
The Framers of the Constitution understood the executive
clemency power that they included "not as a personal privilege but
134. See MOORE, supra note 10, at 4.
135. See Hearing on Pardons, supra note 108, at 30-31 where Constitutional Law
Professors Daniel Kobil, AllanJ. Lichtman, and Ken Gormley all testify before Congress
that nothing short of a Constitutional amendment would be necessary to require any
action or inaction of the President regarding the clemency power.
136. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.11 (2001).
137. See Hearing on Pardons, supra note 108, at 43.
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as an obligation of office."'1 3 8 John Locke, whose influence on the
founding generation was immeasurably important, said:
Many things there are, which the law can by no means
provide for, and those must necessarily be left to the dis-
cretion of him, that has the executive power.. .'tis fit, the
ruler should have a power, in many cases to mitigate the
severity of the law and pardon some offenders. This
power to act according to discretion, for the public good,
without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even
against it, is that which is called prerogative: for since in
some governments the lawmaking power... is usually too
numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to
execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee,
and so by laws to provide for, all accidents and necessi-
ties.. .or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are
executed with an inflexible rigour, therefore there is a lat-
itude left to the executive power, to do many things of
choice which the laws do not prescribe.
13 9
The executive clemency power did not make it into the draft of
the Constitution without debate, and much can be learned about
the intent of the Framers from the discourse that occurred during
the time of the Constitutional Convention. There was a motion in-
troduced by Roger Sherman to only allow the president to grant
reprieves until the next session of the Senate, at which time the
Senate would either give its consent to the pardon or refuse clem-
ency.140 This motion was voted down by a margin of eight to
one. 14 1 Luther Martin moved to require the clemency power be
granted only after conviction. 142 After an objection and after a
brief discussion, the motion was withdrawn.
143
138. Margaret Colgate Love, The Quality of the President's Mercy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
2002, at A39.
139. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 384-86 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
140. See THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 471
(Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1999).
141. Id.
142. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 120, at 422.
143. See id. at 426.
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In a pamphlet, future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell an-
swered concerns about the unilateral and unqualified clemency
power giving the president the ability to shield himself and/or ac-
complices from their misdeeds. 144 Iredell recognized this threat,
but at the same time recognized the threat of imposing a change on
the power as it stood. 145 It would be impossible to foresee the nega-
tive implications of the change. 146 Iredell saw the broad, unilateral
and unqualified nature of the clemency power as being a great ad-
vantage since the president could act with a "great degree of secrecy
and dispatch on critical occasions.' 47 Iredell gave an example of
persons that could provide useful information and services to the
nation but might otherwise be criminals or spies.' 48 These persons
and their contributions are not known to the public and the presi-
dent should have the ability to negotiate and grant clemency to
them, for they could save this nation with timely information. 1
49
Perhaps in the pre-9/11 world, this would have been seen as an
outdated Revolutionary idea. It is no longer so. Many arguments
are made to involve Congress or commissions in clemency deci-
sions, to open up the process to the public. But these changes, as
well as those calling for convictions or specification of charges
before clemency, would render the president unable to pardon a
captured "unlawful combatant." A deal could have been negotiated
with the detainee to provide very useful information that might oth-
erwise prevent terrorist attacks or aid intelligence agencies in find-
ing other dangerous terrorists. These kinds of maneuvers are
useless if publicized or forced to endure bureaucratic debate and
delay.
Another example provided by Iredell is the case of innocent
people who are convicted because popular opinion is so strongly
against them that no judge orjury could be completely impartial.
150
Again, current affairs have made this example quite plausible. Can
Arab men accused of being terrorists in this political climate receive
144. See IREDELL, supra note 1, at 350.
145. Id. at 352.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 352-53.
149. See id.
150. See IREDELL, supra note 1, at 353.
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a fair trial, guilty or innocent?15' How about the American, John
Walker, that had been fighting for the Afghan Taliban? Simply put,
Iredell chose to take the chance of a president acting inappropri-
ately rather than blindly making changes that might result in far
more damage in the future.
1 52
These concerns are echoed in The Federalist Papers No. 74 by
Alexander Hamilton, one of the greatest early proponents of a uni-
lateral and discretionary clemency power. 15 3 Hamilton believed
that the clemency power should be left to "one man.. .as little as
possible fettered" because people derive confidence in their num-
bers and could encourage each other in their passions or ven-
geance. 154 Hamilton explicitly rejected the idea of including either
House of Congress or any other body in clemency decisions and
warned that the more persons involved in the process, the more
difficult and timely it becomes. 155 This, Hamilton feared, could
create bureaucratic gridlock in times of crisis where "the loss of a
week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be fatal."
156
The dangers that the proponents of clemency limitations both
in 1787 and today fear were all considered by the Framers. The
Framers were fully aware of the history of abuse of the royal pardon-
ing power, 15 7 and they were not naive about human nature. Their
own lives provided them with plenty of experience regarding the
links between absolute power and corruption. 158 Despite this, they
chose with almost total agreement and over noted objections to
leave the clemency power in the Constitution absolutely unilateral
and unqualified. Except, of course, for the bar in cases of impeach-
ment, where the Framers clearly believed the president would be
given too much power to shield someone or even himself from the
ultimate check that Congress possesses on the executive and judi-
151. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120-21 (1925) where Chief Justice Taft
himself stated, "the administration ofjustice by the courts is not necessarily always wise
or certainly considerate of circumstances which may properly mitigate guilt". See id.
152. See IREDELL, supra note 1, at 352.
153. See THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 447-49 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
154. Id. at 447-48.
155. See id. at 448-49.
156. See id. at 449.
157. See Moore, supra note 131, at 282.
158. See Hearing on Pardons, supra note 108, at 17.
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cial branches. The important part here is that lines of limitation
were considered and drawn where the Framers deemed appropri-
ate: almost nowhere.
If the Framers intended further limitations, they would not
have expressly rejected them. They could have made the clemency
power like many other executive powers, checked by legislative con-
sent or oversight. Yet they did not, they chose to leave it in the
hands of one person. The arguments recorded by James Madison
at the Constitutional Convention and the arguments employed by
Hamilton in defense of Article II "reinforce the image of pragmatic
men determined to guarantee an effective government even at the
cost of compromising democratic principles." 159 Simply stated, the
Framers sought to make a government that works, not to philoso-




The debates show that the Framers thought the legislature too
powerful and/or too prone to political passions to be entrusted
with the clemency power.161 Recent history regarding the course of
events during judicial and cabinet confirmations shows once again
the foresight and wisdom of the Framers. Perhaps their judgment
should not be so readily questioned. 1
62
Over the 215 years since the Framers have devised "the most
durable charter known to humankind," 163 questionable grants of
clemency have been relatively quite unusual164 and this hardly war-
rants a Constitutional amendment. 165 History has shown that the
wisdom of controversial pardons cannot be judged without hind-
sight.166 All of the reforms attempt to insert other bodies into the
159. See MOORE, supra note 10, at 26.
160. See id. at 27.
161. See Hearing on Improving the Pardon Process Before the House Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Daniel T. Kobil,
Professor of Law at Capital University Law School).
162. Id. at 13.
163. Hearing Concerning Possible Constitutional Amendments to the President's Pardon
Power Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 10 (2001) (statement of Profes-
sor Ken Gormley, Professor of Law at Duquesne University).
164. See Moore, supra note 131, at 284.
165. See Hearing Concerning Possible Constitutional Amendments, supra note 162, at 10.
Professor Gormley testified that amendments should be disfavored unless absolutely
necessary, he would prefer to err on the side of leaving the Constitution undisturbed.
166. See id. at 12.
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clemency decision, whether it be Congress, the media, a profes-
sional commission, the judiciary, or a combination thereof. In any
case, all without hindsight. This would allow other bodies in the
decision making process to judge a president's grant of clemency by
inappropriate gauges such as passions of the moment, before the
merits of a particular grant can be realized.
The proponents of change ignore the explicit intentions of the
Framers to leave the clemency power as it is in the Constitution.
The proponents substitute their own judgment for that of the Fram-
ers, which of course has been done from time to time with Constitu-
tional amendments but only with clear and compelling necessity,
which simply does not exist with the current state of the clemency
power. Amending the clemency power in any substantial way
would, as Hamilton feared, possibly strip the president of the power
in the time when it is needed most. This would all be done at the
expense of a nation and only in the name of rooting out the occa-
sional controversial pardon, a monumental price to pay.
The Role of Clemency in the Separation of Powers
When the Framers diffused the power of the federal govern-
ment into three distinct branches, they sought to create a frame-
work where each branch could exercise checks on the others. This
would ensure that the power would remain balanced, preventing
any one branch from becoming oppressive. A common argument
against the present state of the executive clemency power is that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers because the executive
is permitted to exercise the power with few checks on it. 1 6 7 How-
ever, the Framers recognized the unique unilateral nature of the
clemency power and put the checks in place that would not only
keep the balance of power, but more importantly, would preserve
the essential power and prerogative of executive clemency.
Generally in the federal system, Congress defines crimes and
their punishments and the judiciary interprets and applies those
laws and punishments. 168 The clemency power is itself an executive
167. See, e.g., Clifford Dorne & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive
Justice: Interpretations From a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures, 25 NEW ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 413, 418 (1999).
168. Hoffstadt, supra note 4, at 593.
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check on Congress and the judiciary. 169 The Framers also cau-
tiously added a check with the impeachment exception. 170 If the
president could pardon in cases of impeachment, the check that
Congress has on the executive and judicial branches would be virtu-
ally moot. Along the same lines, if a reform forces the president to
share the clemency power with the legislative and/or judicial
branches, this executive check on the branches that make, apply,
and interpret the laws would also become moot.
During the debates at the Constitutional Convention, when Ed-
mund Randolph moved to except cases of treason as well,
Gouverneur Morris suggested that this particular aspect of clem-
ency be vested in the legislature. 171 James Wilson thought the im-
peachment power of Congress sufficient to keep the executive in
check when granting clemency for treason. 172 Rufus King saw the
proposal as a violation of the separation of powers, to which James
Madison agreed, but suggested involving the Senate alone, albeit
only in an advisory nature. 173 In response, George Mason argued
that the Senate already had too much power and Randolph, who
made the motion, stated that "a great danger to liberty lay in a com-
bination between the president and [the Senate].' 174 After the de-
bate, the motion was voted down eight to two, with one
abstention.
75
There are substantial checks on the president in the exercise
of the clemency power.176 Congress has the power to impeach and
remove a president for any misuse of the power. Although the Su-
preme Court will not review the merits of a grant of clemency, the
Court will review it to ensure it does not infringe another Constitu-
tional right of the grantee or a third party.177 Finally, an often over-
looked check is that of the electorate and public opinion. The
electorate can simply choose not to re-elect a president who abuses
the clemency power.
169. Hoffstadt, supra note 4, at 594.
170. See supra, Section IV, subtitled The Intent of the Framers.
171. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 120, at 626.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 626-27.
174. Id. at 627.
175. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 120, at 627.




The force of this check can be seen by the very fact that the
most controversial pardons are withheld until the last weeks of a
term, where this check has no impact on a lame duck president. It
can also be seen in the case of Ford's pardon of Nixon, which many
believe led to Ford's loss in the next presidential election. 78
Perhaps the most telling example of the American body poli-
tic's check is the atrophy of the clemency power that has taken
place in the later half of the twentieth century.179 With the increas-
ing role of the media in American politics and everyday life, the
discontent with the clemency power has risen proportionately. So
much disgust has been expressed at pardons such as those granted
to Nixon, to the Iran-Contra defendants, and to Rich, that presi-
dents must think twice before exercising the power and having to
face the storm.18 0
Any reform of the executive clemency power that proposes to
take any of the president's power and shift it to another branch,
including setting mandatory rules or standards, and an increased
role of judicial review, undermines the separation of powers doc-
trine and disturbs the balance of powers already in place. The ar-
gument that the clemency power must be checked cannot stand
because the clemency power itself is a broad, final check on the
entire legal and judicial system. If Congress and/or the judiciary
are given another check on the clemency power which already is an
essential executive check on those two branches, then that execu-
tive check is greatly diminished, if not abolished. Any reform that
blurs the roles between the branches in the name of preventing
clemency abuse, undermines the need for a unilateral and unquali-
fied clemency power, and may effectively remove it from the
Constitution.
18 1
178. MOORE supra note 10, at 7.
179. See id. at 82-86.
180. See Kobil, supra note 13, at 602-03, 640-41. This can be implied from the con-
sistent decline in the number of grants of clemency discussed supra notes 58-59 and
accompanying text. Indeed, the drop continued with Clinton until he granted clem-
ency 176 times in his last year, and 219 in the previous eight. See id. Perhaps as the
Clinton Presidency wound down, the goal was to grant the pardons he saw fit, regard-
less of approval ratings that were already quite low due to previous scandal.
181. Hearing on Pardons, supra note 108, at 19.
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The Continuing Need For Clemency
In a time when the executive clemency power has come under
so much fire, it is important to remember how clemency advances
the general welfare, and makes such a dramatic difference in the
thousands of lives it affects, the stories that never make the
headlines.
Clemency in the American system operates as a fail-safe, al-
lowing the president, one person, to stand between a defendant
and the entire legislative and judicial system of laws and enforce-
ment. Our judicial system is a complex one in which general laws
are applied to specific cases.1 82 These applications are marked by
uncertainty and human passion, and therefore are particularly vul-
nerable to error.'8 3 The clemency power is a backup system that
works outside of the rules so it can alleviate the effect of some of
these errors.'8 4 If the same framework of rules of the main system
were applied to the backup system, the same errors and fundamen-
tal flaws are present, effectively nullifying the backup.
In the Odyssey, Odysseus plugged the ears of the men on his
ship and ordered them to tie him to the mast and ignore his subse-
quent orders so that they were not drawn to destruction by the Si-
rens.18 5 In what was arguably the birth of constitutionalism, it was
recognized that unchecked emotion will lead to destruction, that a
structure must be put into place to allow earlier reason to trump
later passion.'8 6 Similarly, the U.S. Constitution needs the clem-
ency power to remain unaltered as one of its own structures to allow
reason to trump passion. This generation must recognize that we
must allow ourselves to be bound by the structures put in place by
the founding generation, rather than letting discontent with the
Clinton grants of clemency, which will seem relatively insignificant
in history's judgment, to get the best of us. We have inherited our
constitutional plan, but it does not belong exclusively to this gener-
ation. We are a bridge between those that have come before and
182. See Moore, supra note 131, at 284.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Robert Blecker, Constitutional Supremacy And Nullification In Ancient
Greece (in progress) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
186. See Blecker, supra note 185.
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those that will come in the future. We are bound to allow both
reason and restraint to triumph over passion.
Clemency promotes public confidence.' 8 7 The public often
loses confidence in an intricate American legal system that must be
rigid by nature, but nonetheless sometimes results in what appears
to be arbitrary justice or disparate sentencing.188 Clemency will al-
ways be needed to ensure the American public that our govern-
ment is dynamic enough to allow itself to alleviate its inevitable
rigidities. ' 8 9
Clemency does not go so far as to reduce pressure to reform
these rigidities, it merely acts in securing the president's ability to
stimulate or participate in a dialogue regarding the wisdom, consti-
tutionality, or effectiveness of the laws, beyond ordinary meth-
ods.' 90 For example, Clinton made a statement with grants of
clemency to first time drug offenders who were sentenced under
what many believe are overly harsh mandatory federal sentencing
guidelines.191 This recent example illustrates how important this
aspect of clemency remains. The mandatory sentences were insti-
tuted by Congress and meted out by the judiciary, but stopped in
the last line of defense with the unilateral executive clemency
power.
Clemency also acts as a means of instituting mercy into our
justice system.' 92 As Hamilton so eloquently stated in reference to
criminal codes, "without an easy access to exceptions of unfortu-
nate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and
cruel" and clemency is "a mitigation of the rigor of the law."
19 3
The Atrophy of the Clemency Power
Perhaps the greatest danger concerning the clemency power
today is not that the power will be exercised in increasingly inap-
propriate manners in the future, as many have suggested in the
187. See Hearing on Improving the Pardon Process, supra note 160, at 10-11.
188. See id.
189. See Hearing on Pardons, supra note 108, at 19.
190. See Hearing on Improving the Pardon Process, supra note 160, at 11.
191. Id.
192. See Hearings on Improving the Pardon Process, supra note 160, at 11.
193. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 153, at 447-48.
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wake of the Clinton Presidency.194 Instead, the real danger is that
the historical controversies over Nixon, Iran-Contra, etc., and the
Clinton controversy will create an atrophy of the pardon power to
the point that its inherent benefits to the general welfare will be lost
even absent any reform. 19 5 In practical terms, it is easy to imagine
how every president following Clinton in the near future would be
extremely hesitant in granting clemency because of the obvious po-
litical fallout, whether it be attacks in the media, before Congress,
in the next election, or on the president's legacy.
19 6
Indeed, Clinton's immediate successor did not exercise his
clemency power once in his first 23 months in office. 197 Once Pres-
ident Bush did grant clemency, he chose to pardon seven unknown
individuals who had committed small crimes and paid the price
long ago.198 These are among thousands of applications that the
administration has denied. 199 The choices were clearly safe choices
that had little chance of backfiring as opposed to commuting
sentences of notorious individuals. The clemency power stirs much
less controversy when used to restore the rights of petty thieves who
have been punished and rehabilitated than when it is used to pre-
vent those found guilty from receiving their full punishments. With
Bush granting clemency only seven times in two years, the damage
that has been done is painfully obvious.
Undoubtedly, in this political climate, at least one person, but
probably many more, who deserve clemency will be passed up be-
cause his or her case may be too controversial and likely to make
the headlines. The clemency power was entrusted to the single
highest authority in the United States alone to guard against this
very situation.
194. See Hearing on Improving the Pardon Process, supra note 160, at 12.
195. See id. This notion is shared by many professors, attorneys, and students who
have studied the clemency power even before the controversy over the Clinton pardons
including, but certainly not limited to, Margaret Love, former U.S. Pardon Attorney,
Kathleen Dean Moore, and Professor Daniel T. Kobil. See id.
196. See id at 13.
197. See Associated Press, Bush Pardons $11 Thief and a Moonshine Seller, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2002, at A20.
198. See id.
199. See Alison Leigh Cowan, Begging Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, November 25, 2001, Sec-
tion 4 at Page 2.
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The question narrows to a balancing test which comes down to
whether one would favor stopping all abuse at the expense of those
that honestly deserve clemency, or permitting relatively minor
abuse and ensuring deserving acts of clemency are granted. If
given the choice of letting ten Marc Riches go free to save one un-
named innocent, the choice, one would hope, is clear.
V. CONCLUSION
Calling for reform of the executive clemency power makes for
great academic and legal debate but falls far short in the practical
world. As this Note illustrates, the calls for reform should go unan-
swered. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution knowingly adopted
the clemency power that was abused in England. The problems we
face today as well the reforms currently proposed were considered
by them and the Framers explicitly and intentionally created a uni-
lateral and unqualified executive clemency power nonetheless,
which the Supreme Court has recognized and unwaveringly
upheld.
Most, if not all reforms involve some type of increase in the
power of Congress and/or the judiciary in matters of clemency, es-
pecially in the form of some type of oversight. This would invaria-
bly violate the separation of powers doctrine which the clemency
power was designed to preserve, and of which the clemency power
is itself a vital part. Finally, clemency plays the very important role
in our society of providing a last chance of mercy for criminals and
innocents alike, in a justice system that is far from perfect, and at
times unreasonably rigid. It is a means of promoting public confi-
dence and of forcing a closer look at unfair laws and sentences.
As the opening quote suggests, proponents of changing this
power propose to substitute their system for one that, while once
every four to eight years is complained about because of one or two
anomalies, works well in preserving freedom and maintaining faith
in the judicial system. These substitutions are a very dangerous un-
dertaking with unintended and unforeseeable consequences that
far outweigh the dangers of the inappropriate use we have seen. In
its simplest form, this Note stands for the proposition that the grav-
ity of the harm done by the executive clemency power as it stands
today and has stood for centuries does not justify the risk of the
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much greater harm of succumbing to the reflex of imposing
change. "'If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by
common consent, it will need a strong case' to overturn it."200 That
case, critical and strong enough to warrant amending the Constitu-
tion of the United States, has yet to be made.
200. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974) (quotingJackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260
U.S. 22, 31 (1922)).
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